Carry / carried interest
Carry is shorthand for carried interest: the manager’s incentive share of investment profit under the agreement. It is separate from management fees and the return on the GP’s own capital.
Fund-level economics · Portfolio outcomes
See how VC commitments, management fees, reserves, portfolio winners, and carried interest translate into LP and GP returns.
One company’s return is not the portfolio return. The portfolio also includes losses and follow-on investments. Fund fees consume part of committed capital, and carry reallocates some profit to the GP. This page follows fund money through those layers; it does not calculate founder dilution or startup liquidation preferences.
Your investment lab
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01 / Sources & uses
Total commitments required
The entire budget is ultimately called. The first call is only the starting check.
| Initial investment | $17,500,000 |
|---|---|
| Follow-on investments | $3,750,000 |
| Other costs | $0 |
| Lifetime management fees | $3,750,000 |
| Total uses | $25,000,000 |
$18,750,000 remains uncalled immediately after year zero. All calls precede the year-10 distribution.
02 / Economics
Before the partners split anything
Before any higher tier, the GP receives 21.6% in total of a residual dollar: 2% as a co-investor plus 19.6% as the incentive allocation. LPs receive the balance.
Capital and the preferred return are paid before this residual split.
Fees are already funded inside the $25,000,000 commitment budget. They are not deducted from exit proceeds a second time. The portfolio multiple applies to $21,250,000 actually invested.
03 / Distribution waterfall
Already funded in the budget. Separate from exit distributions and from carry. Business expenses and taxes are not deducted, so this is not manager profit.
Under these inputs, does the GP receive any carry?
Each bar is a payment tier. Teal goes to LPs, gold to the GP’s invested capital, and purple to the performance allocation.
Capital comes back in proportion to contributions, up to available cash.
0% compounded annually on each funded contribution; not a guaranteed payment.
LPs keep the balance after the incentive allocation; GP co-investment remains separate.
| Tier | LPs | GP co-investment | Carry / promote |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Return invested capital | $24,500,000 | $500,000 | $0 |
| 2. Pay the preferred return | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 3. Split the remaining profit | $30,380,000 | $775,000 | $7,595,000 |
| Total | $54,880,000 | $1,275,000 | $7,595,000 |
LPs + GP co-investment + carry = $63,750,000. Every dollar accounted for.
04 / Risk & reward
Move the exit value and see who absorbs the downside and earns the upside.
Six companies return zero. Three return 1x. What must the last company do?
Gross portfolio multiple: 1.30x.
Keep capital, fees, timing, and proceeds fixed. Change only the incentive structure. Catch-up uses a 100% allocation for this comparison.
| Structure | LP proceeds | GP carry | LP multiple |
|---|---|---|---|
| No carry | $62,475,000 | $0 | 2.55x |
| Hurdle; no catch-up | $54,880,000 | $7,595,000 | 2.24x |
| Hurdle + full catch-up | $54,880,000 | $7,595,000 | 2.24x |
Illustrative available cash before carry as a multiple of all partner contributions. These are scenarios, not probabilities. Fees and capital stay fixed; sale proceeds and, when necessary, retained cash are adjusted to reach each target.
| Equity cash / capital | LP profit / loss | GP investment profit / loss | GP carry |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.50x | -$12,250,000 | -$250,000 | $0 |
| 1.00x | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| 2.00x | $19,600,000 | $500,000 | $4,900,000 |
| 3.00x | $39,200,000 | $1,000,000 | $9,800,000 |
The GP contributes $500,000 and receives $1,275,000 on that investment, plus $7,595,000 of carry. Fee revenue of $3,750,000 is separate and can exist even when investors lose money.
05 / Timing experiment
Move part of the same total cash earlier. Recalculate each payment through the waterfall and compare it with receiving everything at exit.
Move $15,937,500 earlier; leave $47,812,500 for year 10. Contributions, fees, and total available cash stay fixed. The investor split can change.
Cash is already net of operating costs, debt payments, and modeled fees. This experiment does not create cash or forecast a refinance. A real refinance also changes the loan and future payments.
Will earlier cash raise LP IRR? Will fewer dollars accrue to the preferred return? Does a full catch-up change the answer?
Use the ledger to separate timing gains from changes in who receives the profit.
Grey bars are partner contributions. Payment bars separate LP proceeds (teal), GP co-investment (gold), and carry (purple). Year 0 is closing; later dates are year-end.
| Measure | Everything at exit | Your timing case |
|---|---|---|
| LP proceeds | $54,880,000 | $54,880,000 |
| LP profit / loss | $30,380,000 | $30,380,000 |
| LP IRR | 10.30% | 13.23% |
| LP multiple | 2.240x | 2.240x |
| GP carry | $7,595,000 | $7,595,000 |
| First carry payment | Year 10 | Year 10 |
With simple preference, returning capital sooner shrinks the balance earning future preference; a preference payment alone does not return principal. With annual compounding, interest also accrues on unpaid preference. For the same dated cash flows and hurdle, relabeling capital versus interest does not change IRR.
Earlier payments can reduce the preference hurdle and leave more cash subject to carry. A higher LP IRR does not necessarily mean more total LP dollars.
| Year | Total called | LP capital back | LP preference | LP other profit | GP co-investment | GP carry | LP capital left | Unpaid LP preference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | $6,250,000 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $6,125,000 | $0 |
| 1 | $4,687,500 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $10,718,750 | $0 |
| 2 | $4,687,500 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $15,312,500 | $0 |
| 3 | $4,687,500 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $19,906,250 | $0 |
| 4 | $4,687,500 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $24,500,000 | $0 |
| 5 | $0 | $15,618,750 | $0 | $0 | $318,750 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 |
| 6 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 |
| 7 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 |
| 8 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 |
| 9 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 |
| 10 | $0 | $8,881,250 | $0 | $30,380,000 | $956,250 | $7,595,000 | $0 | $0 |
Total payments: $63,750,000. Matches the original $63,750,000 cash pool.
This is a two-distribution, annual-date experiment. It does not model cash paid before later capital calls, multiple operating distributions, refinancing mechanics, daily XIRR, escrow, or clawbacks. Fees are excluded from GP investment return metrics.
Baseline · all payments at final exit
Timing: steps 1–4 use annual capital calls and one final distribution. Step 5 compares an earlier payment plus the reduced final payment. IRRs use annual dates, not daily XIRR. Equity multiple = total distributions ÷ total contributions. GP return metrics include carry, exclude fees, and are N/A if the GP invests no capital. With no positive distributions, IRR is N/A even though the capital loss is 100%. Displayed dollars are rounded; calculations are not.
Know what the words mean
Carry is short for carried interest. Promote is the common real estate term for the same broad performance-incentive concept. A percentage alone is incomplete: identify the profit pool, payment priority, hurdle, catch-up, and treatment of GP co-investment.
Carry is shorthand for carried interest: the manager’s incentive share of investment profit under the agreement. It is separate from management fees and the return on the GP’s own capital.
The term commonly used in real estate for the sponsor’s performance allocation. It often describes the same economic idea as carry. The words alone do not specify the hurdle, catch-up, or whether the quoted GP split includes co-investment.
GP means general partner; LP means limited partner. The sponsor organizes and manages the investment. These labels describe roles; an LLC may use manager and member terminology. The legal documents determine rights and liabilities.
Open the full waterfall glossary · Find a scenario or check model coverage
Understand what you calculated
The default raises $25M: $21.25M for initial and follow-on investments, plus $3.75M for modeled management fees. Reserves are fully deployed into the portfolio here. Unused reserves would need to be added back separately.
Ten equal investments with six complete losses, three 1x results, and one 10x result return 1.3x in total before fund fees and carry. A single impressive winner can coexist with a modest net LP result.
The default uses 20% carry with no preferred return; capital must still come back before carry begins. The controls let you add a hurdle or a catch-up. These are teaching examples, not universal VC terms.
GP/LP carry allocates fund profit between managers and investors. A startup liquidation waterfall allocates company exit proceeds among preferred and common shareholders. They operate at different levels and need separate models.
A small number of companies may drive most of a fund’s proceeds. The winner exercise assumes equal invested dollars and realized cash multiples, with dilution already reflected in those multiples.
The calculator assumes every portfolio position has realized at exit. Markups on unsold companies, secondary-sale discounts, fund extensions, and distributions in kind can change the actual experience.
A larger reserve leaves less for first checks at a fixed fund size. Increasing the investment budget here increases the required raise instead. The tool assumes all modeled commitments are ultimately called.
Steps 1–4 use one final distribution. Step 5 adds one early payment after all capital calls, then a reduced final payment. Both use annual dates and fixed partner ownership. Taxes, recycling, subscription lines, fee waivers and offsets, later calls after payouts, daily XIRR, and contractual clawbacks require a separate model. These examples are tested educational calculations, not a reconstruction of a named fund’s performance or an audit of an actual partnership agreement.
Carry abbreviates carried interest. Promote is commonly used in real estate for the same broad incentive-profit concept. The agreement still determines when it is earned, which profit pool is used, and whether the quoted GP percentage includes co-investment. Management fees and returns on GP capital are separate.
IRR solves for a discount rate that makes cash-flow net present value zero. With contributions and no positive distributions, there is no valid solution. Losing the entire contribution is a 100% capital loss and a 0.00x multiple, but not a calculated −100% IRR. With no GP investment, GP IRR is also undefined.
The lab calculates core whole-pool structures: pro rata, no hurdle, preference without catch-up, partial or full catch-up allocations, and two IRR tiers. It also compares two payment dates. The overview maps additional common terms to explanations, including deal-by-deal carry and clawbacks, and identifies provisions that need a separate model. It is not a universal LPA engine.
No. It is a payment priority, and the cash may be insufficient. With one initial contribution, an 8% simple preference over five years adds 40% to capital; receiving 1.40x at year 5 is about a 6.96% annual IRR. An 8% compounded hurdle requires about 1.4693x over those same five years. Interim cash flows change the calculation.
Only when a distribution reaches an incentive tier in the modeled agreement. Fees can be received earlier and are separate. In the timing step, the chart and annual ledger show the first year carry is paid. Real agreements may also defer cash in escrow or impose clawbacks and other conditions.
Earlier cash generally improves time value, but it can also reduce later preference accrual on unreturned capital and increase carry. Compare net LP dollars, IRR, and the payment priority together. Relabeling the same dated cash flows alone does not change IRR; changing the economic accrual rules can.
These labels commonly mean whole-fund and deal-by-deal carry, respectively; they are not geographic guarantees. Whole-fund terms look across fund contributions and results. Deal-by-deal terms can pay carry sooner, subject to the actual agreement’s loss, reserve, escrow, and clawback provisions. The live lab uses whole-pool economics, not deal-by-deal administration.
No. The published examples are tested teaching models. They assume fixed GP ownership, pro-rata co-investment, the specified fee base, and annual dates. The timing comparison adds one early payment after all calls and one final payment. It does not handle later capital calls after payouts, taxes, recycling, investor-specific side letters, GP fee waivers, daily XIRR, subscription lines, or a contractual clawback. The signed agreement and actual dated cash flows control real distributions.
Independent arithmetic benchmark: $100M capital, $4M accrued preference, $112M to LPs, and $3M carry. The general-page adaptation simplifies the dates.
Distinguishes a cash yield from an IRR hurdle and explains why the agreement’s distribution provisions matter.
An example agreement, not a universal set of terms. See §§14.3 and 14.7; its bracketed catch-up allocation is 80%.
Shows how sponsor fees, hurdles, catch-ups, and promote conventions can differ.
Context for fee and carry terms observed on Carta’s platform; the presets here are illustrative, not a market quote.
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